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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate shareholders elect their boards of directors. 1 They do not, however, use
anything like a conventional ballot. Instead, shareholders fill out a "proxy ballot"
delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent
board's chosen nominees, which are very often the same board members themselves. If a
shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs
to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot. 2
Throughout the last decade, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
been at work developing a rule for allowing shareholders to have access to the corporate
proxy ballot. 3 In 2010, the agency finally passed Rule 14a-11, which would have
required corporations to put shareholder-nominated candidates on the company's own
proxy ballot (as long as certain conditions were met). 4 The 2010 rule was the culmination

* Professor and John DeWitt Gregory Research Scholar, Hofstra Law School.
* Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. We would like to thank Dan Greenwood and Brett
McDonnell for their helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2006); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.21 (2007).
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 215 (2006); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (2007).
3. For a discussion of these proposals, see infra Part II.
4. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). The
regulation was formerly codified as Rule 14a-l1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2010), vacated by Bus.
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of a process that included two previous incarnations, as well as legislation that
specifically paved the way for the rule's creation. 5 Less than a year after its passage,
however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the law, holding
that the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to consider the
rule's costs and benefits adequately. 6 According to the court, the SEC's failure was so
egregious that the Commission's decision to promulgate Rule 14a-l 1 was "arbitrary and
capricious."7
Other commentators have noted that the D.C. Circuit's opinion rests on an extremely
muscular version of judicial review--one that contravenes the traditional deference to
administrative authority. 8 Our concern, however, is with the court's misapplication of
law and economics principles. The court's reasoning in Business Roundtable rests on
flawed empirical and theoretical conclusions about proxy access and corporate
governance. It ignores the benefits of facilitating shareholder democracy and focuses
instead on costs that are routine for any functioning electoral system. As a result, its
decision to strike down the regulation rests on a version of law and economics that
contravenes the discipline's traditional principles and exacerbates agency costs.
Rule 14a-1 1 is open to debate on grounds of policy.9 But the Business Roundtable
decision improperly sides with management by casting one side of the shareholder
democracy debate as "arbitrary and capricious." It is, in fact, the court's opinion that uses
economic and voting-rights principles in a capricious manner. Part II provides a brief
overview of Rule 14a- 11 and the Business Roundtable decision. Part III discusses the
basic theory of voting rights and applies them to the shareholder franchise. Part IV
explains how the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the dynamics of shareholder voting and the
role of Rule 14a-1 1 in the process. Finally, Part V discusses the larger problem
exemplified by the Business Roundtable decision-namely, the growing preference
amongst some law and economics commentators for a Potemkin-Village version of
shareholder democracy, one that undermines the very market principles that they purport
to advance.

Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Commission recognized the vacation of the rule
in Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,100 (Sept. 20, 2011).
5. See infra Part II (discussing the history of the rule).
6. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1146.
7. Id.at 1156.
8. See, e.g., Recent Case, Administrative Law-CorporateGovernance Regulation-D.C.CircuitFinds
SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and Capriciousfor Inadequate Economic Analysis: Business Roundtable v.
SEC, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1088-95 (2012) (concluding that the court "applied an excessively exhausting
standard that all but bars contested reforms"); Steven M. Davidoff, Proxy Access in Limbo After Court Rules
Against It, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, July 27, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/proxy-access-inlimbo-after-court-rules-against-it/ (noting that "the opinion appears to create an almost insurmountable barrier
for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be
effective").
9. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of FederalProxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 439
(2012) (characterizing the rule as "a largely ineffective tool for shareholder nomination of directors"); Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance ofProxy Access, 97 VA. L. REv. 1347, 1432 (2011) (arguing that
proxy access rules, in whatever form, are not "likely to be important").
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1942 To BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE V. SEC

The SEC's proxy access rule was not a lark; it was not a quick-draw policy change
that came out of the darkness. Allowing shareholders direct access to the board's proxy
ballot is, in many ways, an intuitive step. The proxy ballot is designed to look like an
actual ballot-an instrument for casting one's vote in the election of directors. However,
the proxy ballot is in fact simply an instruction to the board as to how one's shares should
be voted at the annual meeting.
The board decides the nominees to be placed on its own ballot and oversees its
distribution. It is much more akin to a letter or request to the board, made on a form that
the board has provided for that purpose, as to how the shareholder's shares should be
voted at the meeting. 10 It is not a ballot. The actual election is conducted at the
shareholders' meeting, and the proxy ballots are used to give the board that shareholder's
proxy votes. If the shareholder was personally appearing at the meeting, she could vote
her shares in person and would have no need for a proxy. For those who are absent, the
company's proxy ballot is a way for the incumbent board to facilitate votes-but on the
board's own terms. Thus, in order to run against the incumbent board and/or the board's
designated replacements, an "insurgent" candidate must provide her own proxy ballots
for distribution. If the shareholder is voting with the board, she turns in the board's
proxy; if voting for the opposition, either the shareholder must show up and vote directly
or she must provide her proxy to the opposition's designee.
Because we are used to voting using a designated ballot, it is natural to confuse the
proxy ballot with an actual one. This confusion is perhaps at the heart of the proxy access
debates. Over time, the proxy ballot has been coopted by the government for various
purposes. The proxy is generally accompanied by massive disclosures required by federal
law; it includes votes over compensation packages and audit providers, and it provides
shareholder access for independent referenda on questions relating to a variety of
potential subjects. 1 1 The ballots are generally sent (via mail or the web) to an accounting
or proxy firm, which collects and counts the proxies, much like an independent election.
Because of these accoutrements, the proxy ballot looks a lot more like a part of an
independent electoral process rather than a request to the board to vote for the board's
nominees as provided on a board form.
Less than a decade after the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC first
considered proxy access for shareholders.1 2 The proposal-debated internally-provided
that "stockholders be permitted to use the management's proxy statement to canvass
stockholders generally for the election of their own nominees for directorships, as well as
for the nominees of the management." 13 Shareholders would have only been permitted to
10. For examples of proxy ballots, see Spotlight on Proxy Matters-ReceivingProxy Materials, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/proxy materials.shtml (last visited
Nov. 7,2012).
11. For a list of the excluded subject areas for proxy proposals, see Rule 14a-8(i), General Rules and
Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18() (2011).
12. Securities and Exchange Commission Release Notice, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed. Reg.
10,653, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
13. See Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 17-19 (1943) (testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell), cited in STAFF OF THE
U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N REP., REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND
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add an additional nominee for each seat; thus, the company could stop adding nominees
once they were twice the number of positions. 14 The Commission did not formally act
upon the idea. 15
Proxy access came up for consideration again in 1977 and 1992. In 1977, the SEC
deferred on access in favor of supporting the work of board nominating committees; the
Commission intended for these committees to consider shareholder candidates as well. 16
In 1992, the Commission opted to expand Rule 14a-4 17 to allow shareholders to include
board nominees on their "short-slate" proxy ballots.18 This reform made it easier for
shareholders to seek minority representation on the board by targeting certain board
nominees out of management's entire slate. 19
Over the past decade, however, the SEC has pursued proxy access in earnest. The
Commission proposed proxy access rules in 2003 as part of a broader suite of proshareholder reforms. Under the 2003 proposal, proxy access hinged on a triggering event:
either a vote on a special Rule 14a-8 proposal subjecting the company to proxy access, or
a 35% or more "withhold" vote for one of the company's directors. 2 0 Once triggered,
shareholders with at least five percent of the voting securities, held for at least two years,
would be entitled to nominate between one and three director candidates. 2 1 The proposal
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 2 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC PROxY REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf (summarizing prior commission action in shareholder
participation).
14. Id.
15. See Securities Exchange Commission Release Notice, 7 Fed. Reg. at 10,653 ("A number of the
suggestions proposed by the staff were not adopted. They are: . . .2. The suggestion that minority stockholders
be given an opportunity to use the management's proxy material in support of their own nominees for
directorships.").
16. 2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. However, there were no formal requirements that the
committees actually place dissident candidates on the ballot.
17. Rule 14a-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2011).
18. 2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 4. A "short-slate" is a group of dissident directors that
falls short of the number of open seats. Id. The change in Rule 14a-4 allowed shareholders to single out a
certain number of board nominees for inclusion on the shareholders' proxy ballots, even if the nominees did not
want to be included. As an example, directors Bl, B2, B3, B4, and B5 are running for reelection. If shareholders
want to nominate S1 and S2 to run against BI and B2, the shareholders can submit a proxy with S1, S2, B3, B4,
and BS, in order to isolate B] and B2, even if B3, B4, and B5 do not want to be on the shareholders' proxies.
19. Id.
20. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,789-90 (proposed Oct. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
240, 249, 274). The Rule 14a-8 proposal would have to have been submitted by a shareholder with at least one
percent beneficial ownership for at least one year. Id. at 60,790.
21, Id. at 60,794-98. The formula for number of nominees was as follows:
As proposed, a company would be required to include one security holder nominee if the total
number of members of the board of directors is eight or fewer, two security holder nominees if the
number of members of the board of directors is greater than eight and less than 20 and three
security holder nominees if the number of members of the board of directors is 20 or more. The
proposal would have a separate standard for companies with classified or "staggered" boards of
directors. Where a company has a director (or directors) currently serving on its board of directors
who was elected as a security holder nominee, and the term of that director extends past the date of
the meeting of security holders for which the company is soliciting proxies, the company would not
be required to include on its proxy card more security holder nominees than could result in the total
number of directors serving on the board that were elected as security holder nominees being
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received numerous comments but, in the end, was never acted upon.22
Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, to create proxy access for shareholder director
candidates, was improperly excluded from a company's proxy materials. 23 The SEC had
sided with the company, arguing that the proposal related to an election and was therefore
excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(8). 24 However, the court held that the exclusion only
referred to proposals concerning a particular election, not those concerning procedural
rules that apply to elections in general. 25 The AFSCME decision led to a period of some
confusion in the proxy world, as the court had rejected the SEC's interpretation of its own
rule. 26 Thus, the SEC either would be stuck with the Second Circuit's decision or would
have to change the rule.
The Commission, confronted with this legal fork in the road, essentially chose to
explore both directions at once. In 2007, it released for comment two alternative
proposals: a shareholder access proposal and a status quo proposal. Under the access
proposal, the SEC would change Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow shareholders to submit
proposals amending corporation bylaws that would give proxy access to shareholder
nominees. 27 Only shareholders owning greater than five percent of a company's voting
securities would be permitted to make proposals in the proxy materials affecting director
nomination and election procedures. 2 8 The access proposal would allow such
shareholders to offer whatever shareholder nomination procedures they desired in the
proxy materials. 29 The only substantive limitations on such procedures would be those
imposed by state law or the company's charter and bylaws. 30 The status quo proposal
was a codification of the SEC's interpretation prior to the Second Circuit's overturning.3 1
The effect of the status quo proposal would be to reverse the Second Circuit's decision in

greater than one if the total number of members of the board of directors is eight or fewer, two if
the number of members of the board of directors is greater than eight and less than 20 and three if
the number of members of the board of directors is 20 or more.
Id. at 60,797-98.
22. Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1354.
23. AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2006).
24. See id. at 123 (discussing a previous version of Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which allowed companies to exclude
a shareholder proposal under 14a-8 that "relates to an election").
25. Id. at 130.
26. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,491 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (discussing
the desire to avoid such uncertainty and confusion).
27. Id. at 43,466.
28. Id. at 43,472. In addition, to be eligible, shareholders could not have acquired or held their securities
for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the company and also had to meet
the requirements of Schedule 13G; any shareholder wishing to circumvent the rule would have to follow the
SEC's other disclosure requirements for hostile takeovers and similar actions. Id
29. Id.
30. Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,472. The actual form and substance of the proposed bylaw
amendments by the shareholders would still be governed by the corporation or state law, and the SEC would
only intervene regarding the procedures of proposing such a bylaw and the disclosure requirements.
31. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,161,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,491 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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AFSCM.E and continue to permit corporations to exclude from proxy materials
shareholder proposals that would affect the director nomination and election
procedures. 32 Ultimately, the SEC adopted the status quo proposal in a divided three to
two vote. 33
In 2009, the SEC released yet another iteration of proxy access. This version created
a new rule-Rule 14a-11-which would provide for direct access to the ballot for
shareholders. 34 The 2009 proposal significantly reduced the requirements for
participation. Only one percent ownership was necessary for companies with over $700
million in assets, sliding up to three percent for those with assets between $75 million and
$700 million, and five percent for those under $75 million. 35 The period for holding the
securities was only one year, and a triggering event was no longer necessary. 36 Most
significantly, the proposal would have made this access a mandatory part of the corporate
structure rather than merely allowing shareholders to implement it on their own.
The SEC received comments on the proposal up through 2010, when the DoddFrank Act specifically gave the Commission the authority to enact proxy access
reforms. 3 7 Soon thereafter, the Commission adopted Rule 14a-1 1 on a three to two
vote. 38 The final rule increased the ownership requirements to three percent but allowed
shareholders to pool their holdings to reach that threshold.39 That three percent had to be
held for three years prior to the nominations and up through the actual shareholder
meeting.40 Shareholders were limited to nominating candidates for up to 25% of the seats
on the board, and they could not intend a change in control. 4 1 In addition, the
Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to propose proxy nomination
processes within their individual corporations. 4 2
32. Id at 43,493.
33. Kahan & Rock, supranote 9, at 1355.
34. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046, Exchange Act
Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,024 (proposed June
18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274).
35. Id. at 29,035.
36. Id. at 29,032, 29,035.
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
971(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) ("The Commission
may issue rules permitting the use by a shareholder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of
securities for the purpose of nominating individuals to membership on the board of directors of the issuer, under
such terms and conditions as the Commission determines are in the interests of shareholders and for the
protection of investors.").
38. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668 (Sept. 16,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
39. Id. at 56,674.
40. Id. at 56,675.
41. Id.
42. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2012). The revised Rule 14a-8 only excludes
proposals that
(i) [w]ould disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; (ii) [w]ould remove a director from
office before his or her term expired; (iii) [q]uestions the competence, business judgment, or
character of one or more nominees or directors; (iv) [s]eeks to include a specific individual in the
company's proxy materials for election to the board of directors; or (v) [o]therwise could affect the
outcome of the upcoming election of directors.
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A little over a month after the rule was adopted, the Business Roundtable and the
Chamber of Commerce filed a petition with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit seeking an injunction against the new rule. 4 3 The SEC stayed the rule pending
judicial review. 44 On July 22, 2011, the D.C. Circuit struck down the regulation under the
Administrative Procedure Act 4 5 for failing "adequately to consider the new rule's effect
upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 46
The court based its ruling on three failures on the part of the Commission. First, the
court found that the SEC failed to calculate the costs and the benefits of the new rule
properly, specifically with respect to the incumbent board's costs of opposing a
shareholder nominee. 47 According to the court, "the Commission failed to appreciate the
intensity with which issuers would oppose nominees and arbitrarily dismissed the
probability that directors would conclude their fiduciary duties required them to support
their own nominees." 4 8 The court also criticized the Commission's "mixed empirical
evidence" on the benefits of proxy access and claimed that the agency had misapplied
state law as an excuse for ignoring certain costs.4 9 Second, the court noted that the SEC
neglected to pay attention to strategic uses of the rule by union and state pension fund
shareholders. 50 The court found "good reason to believe institutional investors with
special interests will be able to use the rule" to advance their "self-interested objectives
rather than the goal of maximizing shareholder value." 5 1 Finally, as to the third failure,
the court accused the Commission of emphasizing the infrequency of elections when
assessing the costs, but not when assessing the benefits. 52 According to the court, "the
Commission's discussion of the estimated frequency of nominations under Rule 14a-11 is
internally inconsistent and therefore arbitrary."53
The D.C. Circuit's decision striking down Rule 14a-1 1 surprised many observers,
including opponents of the rule. 54 In fact, it seems fair to say that most academic

Id.
43. Petition for Review at *2, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (No. 101305), 2010 WL 3770710.
44. Order Granting Stay In re Motion of Business Roundtable, Securities Act Release No. 9149,
Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,456, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,641, 64,641
(Oct. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
45. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2006).
46. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also id. at 1148 ("The petitioners
argue the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously here because it neglected its statutory responsibility to
determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-l 1 and to connect those consequences to efficiency,
competition, and capital formation .... We agree with the petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily
and capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule.").
47. Id. at 1149.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1153.
53. Id
54. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Proxy Access Invalidated on APA Grounds, J.L. POL. & CULTURE (July 22,
2011), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/07/proxy-access-invalidated-on-apagrounds.html ("[C]andidly, while I'm pleased, I'm also surprised. I had thought-and said publicly-that this
suit was a long shot.").
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commentators were quite critical of the opinion. 5 5 Much of the commentary focused on
the level of review called for under the statute-"arbitrary and capricious"-compared
with the regulation's actual flaws as found by the court. 56 This Article, however, does not
focus on the application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the SEC's proxy access
regulation. Instead, it concerns the court's economic and voting-rights analysis
supporting its decision to strike the regulation down. Before turning to that critique,
though, we provide a brief overview of shareholder democracy, in theory and practice.
III. SHAREHOLDERS, DEMOCRACY, AND CORPORATE LAW

All institutions, including business corporations, must make decisions. These
decisions often involve judgments about the needs and desires of a wide variety of
constituents. There are many ways to move from these individual preferences to
institutional choices, and most of the institutions that comprise modern market
economies-from governments to small businesses-employ a range of decision-making
structures designed to take account of their constituents' preferences. They sometimes
rely upon contracts, which are thought to ensure the preference satisfaction of everyone
involved. 57 But once institutions reach a certain size and complexity, contracts alone
cannot do the job. At that point, the institutions resort to some sort of voting mechanism
to translate individual preferences into institutional choices.
A. Governments
Democratic political institutions, of course, rely heavily on voting mechanisms to
translate preferences into social choices; indeed, the ability of its constituents to cast a
meaningful vote is what makes a government "democratic." But when political
institutions settle on voting as the preferred method of preference aggregation, they still

55. Recent Case, supra note 8, at 1093 (stating that the opinion "made missteps similar to those for which
[it] scolded the SEC," and called it "troubling"); Davidoff, supra note 8 (noting that "the opinion appears to
create an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide empirical support amounting
to proof that its rules would be effective"); Brett McDonnell, Dodd-Frank @ 1: An Overall Assessment,
CONGLOMERATE BLOG (July 22, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/dodd-frank-l-an-overallassessment.html ("This opinion is little more than the judges ignoring the proper judicial rule of deference to an
agency involved in notice-and-comment rulemaking and asserting their own naked political preferences. Talk
about judicial activism."); Gordon Smith, Comment to Business Roundtable v. SEC, CONGLOMERATE BLOG
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/business-roundtable-v-sec.html#comment22,
2011),
(July
261374058 ("l had told my students that I thought the lawsuit was not well-founded, so I was surprised by the
opinion. I understand why people would oppose proxy access, but 'arbitrary and capricious'? The process
hardly seems to qualify for that characterization. . . . I am not enamored with the result here."); David Zaring,
More on the DC Circuit's Proxy Access Decision, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/08/the-dc-circuits-proxy-access-decision-keeps-getting-attention-seehere-for-a-roundup-and-here-from-elliott-spitzer-seem.html (stating that the court's analysis is "probably best
characterized as fly-specking, and the kind of searching inquiry no agency could survive," and that "the opinion
isn't very good").
56. See, e.g., Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level ofJudicial Scrutiny and Its
Implications in a Post-Dodd-FrankWorld, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 746, 793 (concluding that the court used
an improperly onerous standard and that it should have upheld the regulation using a more deferential standard).
57. See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in CorporateLaw, 5 VA. L. &
Bus. REV. 239, 248-49 (2010).
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have many decisions to make about how to structure the process. Those decisions are
embodied in a set of legal entitlements, or voting rights, which collectively sketch the
contours of polity. Voting rights, though, are not one-dimensional; instead, there are
many distinct facets to the rights to vote, each of which is necessary to ensure full
democratic participation. 58
The first aspect of the right involves access-the ability to cast a ballot.59 This is
voting rights at its most fundamental. At the beginning of this country's history, most
states only extended the franchise to property-holding white men over the age of 21.60
That, of course, has changed, and many more groups now have access to the ballot. 6 1
There are, however, some restrictions that remain-most jurisdictions restrict voting by
felons or ex-felons, 62 noncitizens, 63 and nonresidents. 64 Minors and people with certain

58. Pam Karlan sets up a taxonomy of three aspects of the right to vote in Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and
Misreadings: The Role of GeographicCompactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 173, 176 (1989). Other ways of parsing out the right to vote, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of
Right Is "The Right to Vote"?, 93 VA. L. REV. 43, 45-52 (2007); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993), are not inconsistent with this conception.
Here, we take Karlan's taxonomy as a starting point and add the slating process into the mix. See also Grant M.
Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1589, 1594-1602 (2004)
(giving a brief account of the history of each aspect of the right).
59. For a relatively recent history of the right to vote, see generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (Rev. ed. 2000). For information

about voting in the early years of the republic, see generally MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A
HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960). For information about voting rights in more
recent years, with an emphasis on the quest for minority representation, see generally BERNARD GROFMAN ET
AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE
SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY
SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS INTHE SOUTH, 1944-1969
(William E. Levchtenburg ed., 1976); QUIET REVOLUTION INTHE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
60. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 306-15 (listing property and taxpaying requirements in the colonies
and states between 1776 and 1855).
61. African Americans and other racial minorities initially secured voting rights through a series of
constitutional amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(granting national citizenship, rights of due process, and equal protection); U.S. CONST. amend XV (prohibiting
voting rights discrimination on the basis of race). For a discussion of passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, see
generally WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1965); KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 74-83. Those protections were lost as a result of Southern
resistance and Northern indifference, see GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 5-10; Hayden, supra note 58, at
1595, but largely restored with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973bb-1
(2000). KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 107, 111-16; KOUSSER, supra note 59, at 31-39; see GROFMAN ET AL.,
supranote 59, at 12-21; LAWSON, supra note 59, at 329-52. For more information on the passage of the Voting
Rights Act, see LAWSON, supra note 59, at 288-328; KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 211-15. Women secured
access to the polls in 1920 through the Nineteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, and 18-to-21-year
olds through the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
62. See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over
Felon Disenfranchisement,56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1147-48 (2004).
63. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L.REV. 1391, 1397-1418, 1460-67 (1993).
64. See Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, One-Vote: Better Results from the
Voting Rights Act?, 74 TEX.L. REv. 1153, 1159 (1996).

110

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 38: 1

mental impairments are also not allowed to vote. 65 But, although we are far from
universal suffrage, a greater proportion of the population can vote now than could at the
country's founding.
In a sense, the question of "who" should have a right to vote is relatively
straightforward. The debate is essentially over which groups should be considered
members of the polity whose preferences should be reflected in electoral outcomes. The
issue becomes more complicated once we move from "who" votes to "how" they vote. It
does so because the mechanics of most election procedures-things like registration
requirements, voting methods, and vote counting-may themselves restrict the right to
vote, but in subtle ways that depend upon whether the procedures have a disproportionate
effect on some voter-relevant group. 66 For example, if a state requires voters to produce
photographic identification in order to vote, and large numbers of, say, poor people lack
such identification, then that may skew the outcome of the election. 67 In a sense, then,
both who has a right to vote and how they vote can affect access to the electoral system.
Mere access to the polls, though, guarantees very little, especially in a representative
democracy. 68 To begin with, votes may end up carrying different numerical weights. 69
Sometimes, as in weighted voting systems, this is part of the design. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, assigns different numbers of votes to each member
country. 70 In other cases, votes are weighted differently as a result of deliberate
indifference to underlying demographic changes. In the first half of the 20th century,
many states refused to redraw district lines in the face of tremendous demographic
changes. 7 1 This had the effect of diluting the numerical voting power of those in more
populous (largely urban) districts and concentrating it in the less populous (rural)
districts, 72 a situation remedied by the Supreme Court in its one person, one vote

65. See KEYSSAR, supranote 59, at 287-88.
66. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (noting that "[e]ach provision of these [state
election codes], whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of
candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to
vote and his right to associate with others for political ends"); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial
Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 314-36 (2007)
(explaining the sliding scale of scrutiny applied to election codes).
67. See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1365-66 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (granting
preliminary injunction precluding Georgia from applying a photo ID requirement in upcoming elections).
68. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of
ShareholderHomogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 445, 451 (2008).
69. For background on this aspect of the right to vote, see generally STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES
M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS (2008); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITICS (1968); REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968); GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION:
REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); ROBERT B. MCKAY,
REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1965); Hayden, supra note 58;

Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003) [hereinafter
Hayden, One Person].
70. IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, INT'L MONETARY FUND
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/members.htm.
71. See Hayden, One Person,supra note 69, at 219.
72. See id.
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decisions in the 1960s. 73 The ability to cast a meaningful vote, though, can clearly be
inhibited by either denying access to the polls or by numerically diluting one's vote.
Democratic political entities take many factors into consideration when making
decisions about voting access and weight. Chief among these, though, is some assessment
of a voter's interest in the political entity-what they have at stake in the outcome of the
election. 74 Those with a strong interest in the outcome are obvious candidates for the
franchise; those with little riding on it are rarely extended voting rights. 75 Given that
voting mechanisms are primarily a method of aggregating individual preferences, it
makes some sense to start with those who actually have strong feelings on the matters at
issue. 76 They may also make better informed decisions and help ensure that the election
outcome is viewed as legitimate.7 7
Because political entities have no way of directly measuring the strength of one's
preferences, they usually rely upon proxies for voter interest. 78 In the past, states claimed
that their property-holding and taxpaying requirements were put in place to ensure that
those voting had a sufficient economic stake in the outcome of an election. 79 While such
restrictions appear antiquated, and even discriminatory, the underlying assumption that
voting should be tied to interest persists. We just think we have better proxies. Residency
requirements, for example, allow us to target people living within the borders of a
government whose power is, to a great degree, geographically circumscribed: those
people within the borders are those with a greater stake in the outcome of elections.80
And this connection between voter access and voter interest has been endorsed by the
Supreme Court. 81
Political entities also attend to voter interest when assigning weights to votes. In
weighted voting systems, the weight is often assigned in proportion to the voter's
perceived stake in the enterprise. In the IMF, a member's voting power is largely
determined by the resources that the member contributes to the fund. 82 Other types of
voting systems follow suit, though sometimes in ways that are not as obvious. Take, for
example, the one person, one vote requirement. The U.S. Constitution requires that
districting for the House of Representatives, both houses of state legislatures, and local
governmental entities be done in a way that assigns equal numerical weight to votes. 8 3
The requirement may involve a positive judgment that all are equally interested in the
73. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
74. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 452-60.
75. Id.
76. See id at 453.
77. Id.
78. Id at 454.
79. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 454.
80. Id at 454-55, 460.
81. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) (noting that in the context of special
interest elections, the state may disenfranchise those who lack certain interests); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.15 (1969) (noting that a person residing in a certain district may participate in an
election because he has an interest); Hayden & Bodie, supranote 68, at 455-56.
82. IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Boardof Governors, supra note 70.
83. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (House of Representatives); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (state legislatures); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479-81 (1968) (local
governments).
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outcome of an election; more likely, it reflects our inability to make such finely tuned
assessments of the strength of people's preferences. 84 In any case, though, an exception
to the one person, one vote requirements-special purpose districts-may help
demonstrate the relationship between voter interest and voting weight. The governing
boards of special purpose districts are allowed to restrict the franchise to those most
affected by its decisions and then further fine-tune voting weight with that interest. 8 5
Water boards, for example, are allowed to restrict voting to landowners and, further,
weight the votes according to how much land each voter owns. 86 This one acre, one vote
system is thought to more accurately tailor voter interest with voting weight.
The ability to cast an equally weighted vote, however, does not guarantee an equal
opportunity to participate. There are a variety of other ways to keep like-minded voters
from electing candidates of their choice. Some of these manipulate the ways in which
votes are combined. At-large elections, anti-single-shot laws, and gerrymanders are all
used to dilute the voting power of certain groups. 8 7 Gerrymandering district boundaries,
for example, can take groups that could constitute an effective majority in one district and
split them into two districts so they are a majority in neither.8 8 The legal status of
attempts to dilute a group's voting power depends upon the type of group being targeted.
Racial groups are afforded greater legal protection than, say, members of a political
party.8 9
The other way to keep groups from electing their preferred candidates is to interfere
with the slating process. This may be done from the top down, such as by prohibiting
certain candidates from running for or holding office. In the aftermath of the Civil War,
the federal government forced states to allow blacks to vote; the state of Georgia
90
immediately responded by passing a law that prohibited blacks from holding office.
One may also interfere with group voting power from the bottom up by limiting group
members' access to earlier stages of the slating process. In the first half of the 20th
century, southern states used the white primary as a means of keeping black voters out of
the primary elections, eliminating their preferred candidates at that stage and leaving
them to choose between unpalatable alternatives in the general election. 9 1 The group in
control of the slating process can effectively control electoral outcomes. 92
84. See Hayden, One Person,supra note 69, at 251-52.
85. See id. at 252-55 (discussing special-purpose districts as a method of weighting votes).
86. For examples of decisions concluding that a water district is not subject to the usual one person, one
vote requirements, see generally Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
87. See BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY, & RICHARD G. NIEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND
THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 23-24 (1992).
88. See Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderingand Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 85, 86-99 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (discussing techniques used in racial gerrymandering).
These strategies of "cracking" and "packing" voters are discussed in several Supreme Court opinions as well.
See, e.g., Thornburg, Attorney Gen. of N.C. v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,46 n.11 (1986).
89. Compare Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny when race is the
predominant factor in districting), with Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (refusing to adjudicate a political
gerrymandering claim).
90. See KEYSSAR, supranote 59, at 86.
91. See generally DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY
IN TEXAS (2003).

92.

This is also true for the less obvious reason that a group with agenda control can take advantage of
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In the United States, the slating processes for federal, state, and local offices, as well
as those for state initiatives, are largely controlled by the states. And, in addition to the
historical attempts to control black voting rights, states have used a variety of techniques
to limit ballot access. Most states have relied upon filing fees and signature requirements,
or some combination of the two, to qualify for placement on the ballot. 93 The filing fees
typically vary by office, are based upon some percentage of the yearly salary for that
office, and may sometimes be waived, in whole or in part, with the submission of a
certain number of signatures. 94 The signature requirements may be stated either in
absolute terms or calculated as a percentage of the voter turnout in some recent election,
usually a gubernatorial election. 95 The barriers to entry are often designed in a way to be
particularly onerous for minority party and independent candidates. 96
Ballot access restrictions are typically justified on two main grounds. First by
limiting the number of candidates or alternatives on the ballot, the restrictions are said to
prevent voter confusion. 97 Second, ballot access laws are claimed to promote electoral
stability by keeping frivolous candidates off the ballot or, more to the point, preserving
the two-party system.98 Other purported goals include more tangential benefits, such as
the government's interest in the revenue raised through filing fees. 99
Restricting ballot access, however, comes at a real democratic cost. As discussed
above, elections are first and foremost about preference aggregation. People's preferences
about all sorts of things-from food to books to political candidates-range widely, and
any respectable system of preference aggregation needs to account for that variation. 100
People's preferences are not meaningfully reflected in electoral outcomes if too many
options are taken off the table before voting even begins. To put it in more marketoriented terms: ballot access laws are government regulations that stifle electoral
competition.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has analyzed ballot access as an integral
component of the right to vote. In order to be more than a procedural formality, the right
to vote effectively must be "understood as the right to vote freely for the candidate of
one's own choosing." 10 1 This initially led the Court to view all ballot access laws with
great suspicion, subjecting them to strict scrutiny, which required the state to justify any

potential voting cycles and manipulate an agenda in a way that favors its desired outcome. See Grant M.
Hayden, Some Implications ofArrow's Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REv. 295, 312-13 (1995).
93. Mark R. Brown, PopularizingBallot Access: The Front Door to Election Reform, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1281, 1284-85 (1997).
94. See, e.g., Signature Requirements and Deadlinesfor 2012 State Legislative Elections, BALLOTPEDIA
(July 1, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Signature-requirements and deadlines for
2012_state legislative elections (detailing the filing fees for each state).
95. See id. (detailing the signature requirements for each state).
96. Oliver Hall, Death by a Thousand Signatures: The Rise of Restrictive Ballot Access Laws and the
Decline ofElectoral Competition in the United States, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 407, 422-24 (2005).
97. Id at 420-21.
98. Id at 421-22.
99. Brown, supra note 93, at 1307.
100. For that very reason, one of the principles of democratic fairness in Arrow's Theorem is universal
admissibility, which demands that a social choice mechanism needs to be able to work with any possible
preference profile. Hayden, supranote 92, at 298.
101. Hall, supra note 96, at 425.
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restriction as a necessary means to a compelling governmental end. 102 The Court devised
and applied that standard in the 1968 decision Williams v. Rhodes, striking down an Ohio
requirement that new party candidates had to submit over 400,000 signatures by February
of an election year. 103
Since Williams, however, the Court has been less critical of ballot access laws
because, upon reflection, it turns out that the mechanics of most state election
procedures-including ballot access and other things such as registration requirements,
voting methods, and vote counting-may, in some sense, restrict the right to vote. And
subjecting every one of these state requirements to strict scrutiny seemed excessive. The
Supreme Court avoided such a result by fashioning a new method of analyzing
constitutional challenges to the mechanics of registration and voting. In Burdick v.
Takushi, the Court established a sliding scale where the degree of judicial scrutiny given
to a state requirement depends upon the "character and magnitude" of its burden on
voting rights. 104 Where the voting rights are subject to "severe" restrictions, something
akin to ordinary strict scrutiny is applied where the regulation must be "'narrowly drawn
to advance a state interest of compelling importance."' 1 05 But in cases where the
regulation imposes only "'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon voting
rights, "'the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the
restrictions." 106 Thus, the one-dimensional application of strict scrutiny is moderated in
recognition of the fact that all election regulations have some effect on the right to vote.
Ballot access laws, then, are supposed to strike an appropriate balance between
maintaining electoral stability and preserving meaningful choice. In effect, however, the
move away from strict scrutiny has given states quite a bit of leeway when it comes to
restricting access to the ballot. Minor party and independent candidates oftentimes have a
difficult time making it onto the ballots, diminishing the range of options available to
voters, and leading some scholars to argue that ballot access laws are the most anticompetitive feature of the American electoral system. 10 7
Democratic voting systems, then, should be designed to produce group decisions
that accurately reflect the underlying individual preferences. They should begin by
identifying people with an interest in the polity and ensuring that they have equal access
to the voting system. Those votes are weighted equally unless there's some strong reason
to suspect that people's levels of interest are unequal in a way that can be accurately
measured (as with special purpose districts). Once these individual voting rights are
secure, care must be taken to ensure that groups of like-minded individuals have an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, something that can be frustrated in a
variety of ways in either the slating process or the vote aggregation process. In the end,
democratic political systems should be designed to translate individual preferences into
group choices without skewing the result in any particular direction.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
Id.at 23, 31-34; Hall, supra note 96, at 424-25.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,434 (1992).
Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
E.g., Hall, supra note 96, at 414-15.

2012]

The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC

115

B. Corporations
While business corporations are very different from political entities, they too
confront the issue of translating individual preferences into group choices. 10 8 When we
think of a corporation, we generally picture a collection of people and assets with some
common commercial goal. The corporation itself is a fiction-a government-created
organizational entity with only legal-not actual-personhood. Thus, perhaps it's more
useful to conceive of a corporation as a legal structure designed to allocate rights and
duties among a group of people devoted to some shared enterprise. 109 The group itself is
a rather diverse set of constituents, and may be said to include the many types of people
with an interest in the enterprise, including directors, officers, shareholders, employees,
bondholders, suppliers, and even customers.
While there are a number of features considered essential to the legal structure of a
corporation, 1 10 the keys to its decision-making structure (and thus this Article) are shared
ownership interests by investors and delegated management. 11 1 The three players within
this governance structure are the shareholders, the board of directors, and the officers. 112
The shareholders, sometimes called the "owners" of the firm, 113 have the right to receive
residual profits as well as the right to elect the board of directors. 114 The directors are, in
turn, the locus of authority within the corporation; like a legislature, they act as the firm
when its ordinary representatives-its employees-lack authority.1 15 The board of
directors, though, does not generally run the business; directors usually delegate this
power to the officers of the corporation. These officers in turn select the remaining
employees. The structure is hierarchical, in that shareholders can vote out directors,
directors can fire the officers, and officers can fire the remaining employees. 116
When looking at this structure in the context of political institutions, we are
immediately struck by the fact that it is only shareholders who are having their

108. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 460.
109. Corporations are not, of course, the only form of business organization-there are sole
proprietorships, partnerships, trusts, and an assortment of variations of them. Corporations, though, are
generally viewed as the most complex business entities, and the ones that currently dominate the economic
activity in the United States.
110. Scholars have isolated five factors that they consider essential to the corporate form: (1) full legal
personality, including the ability to bind the firm to contracts; (2) limited liability for owners and managers; (3)
shared ownership by investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board structure; and (5)
transferable shares. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439-40 (2000); cf ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) (listing four characteristics of the
corporation: (1) limited liability for investors; (2) free transferability of investor interests; (3) legal personality;
and (4) centralized management).
111. Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 110, at 440-41.
112. CLARK, supranote 110, at93.
113. Commentators have objected to this characterization. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 (2006) (calling this view "deeply erroneous");
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192
(2002) ("From both a legal and an economic perspective, the claim that shareholders own the public corporation
simply is empirically incorrect.").
114. This designation is something of a misnomer. See text accompanying infra notes 116-17.
115. CLARK, supranote 110, at2l.
116. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 547, 555-58 (2003) (discussing the hierarchical nature of corporate structure).
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preferences aggregated through a formal voting system. The corporation encompasses the
daily activities of a variety of different players: directors, officers, executives,
management, and employees. Moreover, there are a variety of outside stakeholders who
have interests in the activities of the corporation, akin to shareholders: bondholders,
suppliers, customers, even the community at large. However, when it comes to
aggregating the preferences of the polity in order to determine the leadership of the
corporation, only shareholders are invited to participate in the franchise.
This structure looks like it runs against the basic prescription in politics that all those
with an interest in the enterprise should be accorded voting rights. But according to the
traditional law and economics theory of corporate law, the corporate structure aggregates
constituents' preferences in the most efficient manner. 117 This efficient aggregation
works, according to its proponents, because most corporate constituents, both inside and
outside the corporation, have their preferences captured by contract. 118 Employees, for
example, receive a certain wage for their labor; consumers buy the company's products at
a certain price. These contracts are thought to be the most straightforward way to capture
the preferences since all parties consenting to a contract must prefer the state of affairs
under the contract to their status ex ante.119 Thus, each contract is posited to be a Pareto
improvement. 120 The law and economics approach argues that shareholders have their
entitlements fixed by contract too, but among their entitlements is the right to elect the
board of directors and, ultimately, control the firm. 12 1
The primary justification for limiting voting rights to shareholders is the theory of
shareholder primacy. 122 Shareholder primacy is the theoretical driver not only for the
vote, but also for such key concepts as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 12 3
Shareholder primacy essentially means that corporations exist to serve the interests of
shareholders. 124 Put more specifically, the theory mandates that the corporation be run
with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. Shareholder primacy could simply be a
democratic legitimacy argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder interests at the
forefront, because shareholders are the voting polity. But this leaves a critical question
unanswered: who made the shareholders the voting polity? The choice of this group as
the voting "citizens" of the polity is what needs justifying. 125 A variant of this
justification is that shareholders are the corporation's "owners" and thus are entitled to
117. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw (1996). For purposes of this article, we frequently draw upon the Easterbrook and Fischel
conception of the law and economics of the corporation because of its influence and its effort to provide a
comprehensive approach. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008) ("The work of Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel is emblematic of the growing influence of law and economics in corporate law."); Troy A.
Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 112 n.48
(2003) (calling their book "one of the most influential works espousing the contractarian theory of the firm").
118. Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 553.
119. Id. at 583.
120. Id. at 583-84.
121. Id. at 548.
122. Id. at 568-71.
123. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 90-93.
124. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277 (1998) ("The
structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally operate in the interests of shareholders.").
125. Id. at 278-79.
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the ownership rights of profits and control. 126 However, the ownership justification is
also doomed by its circularity: who made the shareholders the owners? 127 Labeling
shareholders "owners" is no more of a justification for the vote than is labeling them
"voters."
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel provided a justification for shareholder
primacy beyond simple labels. In looking to ground shareholder primacy in economic
theory, they looked to the traditional economic utility rationale of creating the highest
level of efficiency or overall social utility. 12 8 Shareholder primacy theory argues that
maximizing shareholder wealth will generate the highest amount of surplus and thus will
result in the greatest overall social utility. 129 Instead of being the "owners" of the
corporation, shareholders were one group of many whose contracts with one another
jointly created the fictional corporate "entity." 130 However, shareholders were the sole
"residual claimants": that is, their returns were not payable until the other contractual
participants-creditors, employees, customers, suppliers-had been fully satisfied. 131
Because shareholders are not paid until these set contractual payments have been made,
Easterbrook and Fischel argue, all other claimants received their contractual entitlements,
and the shareholders benefited from the maximization of the residual.
Thus, the law and economics theory of the corporation requires that control of
corporate decision making is, ultimately, concentrated in the hands of the shareholders in
order to maximize the preference satisfaction of all involved. Shareholders, as the
residual claimants, are assigned what is left after all fixed claims on corporate proceeds
have been paid. 132 Managers and directors are assigned, by contract or statute, a fiduciary
duty to shareholders in order to make the residual attractive. 133 And other parties can be
offered enough to keep them involved in the corporate enterprise. 134 Total proceeds
should be higher, according to law and economic theory, if the residual claims are
assigned to one group.1 35 Easterbrook and Fischel give the nod to shareholders over other
stakeholders in lieu of contractual claims because that is the best way to induce them to
136
put their money at risk while also relinquishing any real control over how it is used.
Again, the result is a combination of managerial control (as expressed by the business
judgment rule) and shareholder interest (expressed by charging the managers with
maximizing shareholder wealth) that is supposed to be a Pareto improvement over both
direct shareholder control and a system that tries to look out for all stakeholder

126. The classic example of this perspective is Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is
to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32-33, 122-26.
127. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 113, at 1190-92 ("[T]he claim that shareholders own the public
corporation simply is empirically incorrect.").
128.
129.
130.

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 35-39.
Id.
Id. at 36.

131. Id. at 36-37. This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly set contractual
entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 67-70.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 90-93.
Id. at 22-25.
Id. at 35-39.

136. Id. at 67-70.
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interests. 137
This is why, under law and economics theory, the "one share, one vote" rule is a
"logical consequence" of the theory of shareholder primacy. 138 The "one share, one vote"
rule requires that each share of stock have equal voting weight with all other shares. In
this way, the voting interest is equal to the interest in the residual. Shares with
disproportionate voting power create skewed incentives. As Easterbrook and Fischel
argue, "[t]hose with disproportionate voting power will not receive shares of the residual
gains or losses from new endeavors and arrangements commensurate with their control;
as a result, they will not make optimal decisions." 1 39 As a result, those with control will
have the incentive to seek disproportionate gains that do not directly inure to the owners
of the residual. 140 The residual will no longer be maximized, discouraging equity
investment and leading to a decline in societal efficiency.
Thus, the law and economics theory of shareholder primacy rests on the notion that
shareholders will improve social welfare by focusing on increasing the corporation's
residual profits. Shareholder primacy is enforced through shareholder voting and the
market for corporate control, which uses the shareholder vote to effectuate changes in
management. Essential to the theory is the notion of shareholder homogeneity: namely,
that shareholders all have a common, homogeneous interest in increasing residual profits,
and therefore all will use their voting rights in furtherance of this goal.
Over the last several years, however, it has become clear that shareholders are not,
in fact, the homogeneous wealth maximizers posited by the law and economics model.
Instead, their interests diverge along a number of dimensions. 14 1 Shaun Martin and Frank
Partnoy have recently focused attention upon the problems caused by equity derivatives,
which carve up various shareholder rights into discrete financial securities. 142 But there
are many other ways in which shareholders fail to share common interests. For example,
some shareholders may be in a control group and others may not. 143 Employee and
from non-employee
have different interests
shareholders
pension-holding

137. Id. at 35-39; see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 306-07 (1976) (arguing for shareholder
primacy); Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw: A CriticalAssessment, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1629, 1670-71 (2002) (defending the exclusive shareholder franchise).
138. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 73 ("Votes follow the residual interest in the firm, and
unless each element of the residual interest carries an equal voting right, there will be a needless agency cost of
management.").
139. Id; see also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARv. L. REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996) ("The case for the one share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to
match economic incentives with voting power and to preserve the market for corporate control as a check on
bad management.").
140. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 811, 851 (2006) (discussing concerns that controlling shareholders without a
commensurate economic stake in the corporation are more likely to "tunnel" away a disproportionate share of
firm value).
141. For articles cataloging the ways in which shareholder interests diverge, see Hayden & Bodie, supra
note 68, at 477-99; Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About IncreasingShareholderPower, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 577-93 (2006).
142. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 778-81 (2005); see
also Hu & Black, supranote 140, at 815.
143. See Hayden & Bodie, supranote 68, at 477-80.
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shareholders. 144 Traditional shareholders may have different time horizons for wealth
maximization that cannot be costlessly equalized through existing financial
instruments. 145 And even when shareholder interests line up and they agree on a
definition of wealth maximization, they may differ as to the best way to achieve that
goal. 146 Ultimately, the notion that shareholders have homogeneous preferences is a
simplifying assumption that is increasingly under strain. 147
The lack of shareholder homogeneity carries two consequences. First, the principal
law and economics arguments for exclusive shareholder voting are less persuasive than
once believed. 148 Second, the lack of homogeneity puts pressure on the way the voting
mechanism is structured. Of course, all social choice procedures are intended to work
with diverse preferences. The entire point of most voting systems is to take a set of
individual preference profiles and aggregate them into a group choice (indeed, if
preferences were completely homogeneous, we could just poll one member of the
electorate and skip the rest of the process). We do, however, need to ensure that the
voting structure doesn't skew in any particular direction.
In the relatively simplified world of corporate elections, taking care of such a
problem is not that difficult. We should not, for example, be that concerned about
skewing a result toward a minority interest-simple majority votes on the largely binary
sets of alternatives will take care of that. More worrisome is that a tyrannical majority,
temporary or otherwise, will exploit a minority interest. Most political democracies
attempt to blunt the effects of what the founders called "faction" by making a system of
government less responsive to the electorate and providing substantive protections to
minorities. 14 9 The same approach is taken in corporate law, where there are many layers
between shareholders and most corporate decision making and various protections for
minority shareholders. 150
One thing that is typically off the table is limiting the voting rights of a particular
group of voters because of the content of their preferences. It is a fundamental principal
of democratic fairness that people should not be ineligible to vote because of their
opinions. 15 1 This is also consistent with the demands of standard economics that you take

144. See id at 486-88.
145. See id. at 492-94.
146. See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow's Theorem and the Exclusive ShareholderFranchise,62
VAND. L. REv. 1217, 1230-32 (2009).
147. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 142, at 778 ("It is simply not true that the 'preferences of
[shareholders] are likely to be similar if not identical."' (quoting EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at
405)); see also Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 477-99 (discussing various ways in which shareholders'
interests differ); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021, 1052 (1996) ("For fictional shareholders, whatever else the people
behind them may want, all want to maximize the value of their shares.").
148. Hayden & Bodie, supranote 68, at 499-504.
149. In the United States, this meant, among other things, dividing the government into three branches with
checks on each other, dividing the federal legislature into two chambers, and making one of those chambers (the
Senate) less responsive to the people. The substantive protections are embodied in the Bill of Rights and some
of the subsequent amendments to the Constitution.
150. For a discussion of protections for corporate minority shareholders, see generally Anupam Chander,
Minorities, Shareholderand Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003).
151. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, XV, XIX.
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preferences as they come. 152 People's preferences are supposed to determine market
outcomes and be reflected in institutional decision making rather than the other way
around. 153 The function of a voting procedure, for political and corporate entities, is to
aggregate those preferences.
IV. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING
Critics have assailed the Business Roundtable decision as a "troubling" effort aimed
at "asserting [the judges'] own naked political preferences." 154 The court imposed a far
tougher standard on the Commission than the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard
would seemingly require. 155 However, at the root of the court's analysis is a skewed view
of the economics underlying the proposed Rule 14a- 11. It is the court's law and
economics analysis, rather than its application of administrative law, that we intend to
explore. The Business Roundtable opinion demonstrates both bad empirical analysis of
the underlying costs and benefits, as well as bad theory about the effect of the Rule on the
company and shareholder behavior. These two failings are discussed in more depth
below.
A. Bad Empirics

According to the D.C. Circuit, the SEC had an obligation to "determine the likely
economic consequences of Rule 14a- 11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency,
competition, and capital formation."1 56 One of the court's primary criticisms of the
SEC's rulemaking on Rule 14a- 11 was its supposed failure to demonstrate that the rule
was justified by empirical evidence. According to the court, the Commission had "not
sufficiently supported its conclusion" that the new rule would improve company
performance and shareholder value "[i]n view of the admittedly (and at best) 'mixed'
empirical evidence." 15 7 Commentators have pointed out that this view of the evidence
flips the standard of review on its head, by requiring an agency to demonstrate
conclusively that its regulation will provide more benefits than costs. 158 But on a more
fundamental level, the court misperceives its ability to judge the regulation's support in
the empirical literature.
152. See Stephen E. Ellis, Market Hegemony and Economic Theory, 38 PHIL. Soc. SC. 513, 516 (2008) ("It

is a foundational principle of standard economics that people act to satisfy their preferences, whatever they
are.").
153. See id. at 525 ("Standard consumer theory starts with overall preferences.").
154. Recent Case, supra note 8, at 1093-95 (saying that the opinion "made missteps similar to those for
which [it] scolded the SEC," and called it "troubling"); McDonnell, supra note 55 ("This opinion is little more
than the judges ignoring the proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in notice-and-comment
rulemaking and asserting their own naked political preferences. Talk about judicial activism.").
155. See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 8 ("[T]he opinion appears to create an almost insurmountable barrier
for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be
effective.").
156. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144,1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
157. Idatll5l.
158. Recent Case, supra note 8, at 1093-95 (arguing that the court's opinion established "unattainable
standards" using arbitrary and capricious levels of review); Zaring, supra note 55 (calling the court's analysis
"the kind of searching inquiry no agency could survive").
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According to the court's analysis, the SEC "relied upon insufficient empirical data
when it concluded that Rule 14a- 11 will improve board performance and increase
shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident shareholder nominees." 1 59
However, the court's own analysis of the empirical data is extremely cursory, particularly
in contrast to that of the Commission. In its Final Rule, the SEC spends significant time
reviewing a variety of empirical studies that have been conducted on the issue. 160 Indeed,
the court itself notes that the Commission "acknowledged the numerous studies
submitted by commenters that reached the opposite result."1 6 1 However, the court itself
cites to only one of those studies. 162 It then attacks two of the studies that the
Commission did rely on. 163 It again cited to the Commission's own acknowledgment,
this time that one of the supporting studies has long-term findings that are "difficult to
interpret." 1 64 Other than that, the court simply called the two studies "unpersuasive" and
the overall evidence "( . . . at best) mixed," and concluded that the SEC had "not

sufficiently supported its conclusion." 165
The court's cursory analysis of the empirical debate fails on many levels. First, it is
completely unpersuasive in its attempt to show that the empirical literature stacked up in
opposition to the rule. The court's only citation to this opposing literature is to a report
authored by NERA Economic Consulting, on behalf of the Business Roundtable, in
support of the Roundtable's opposition to the Rule. 166 The report is a commissioned
document-akin to a legal brief-submitted to the SEC in support of the Roundtable's
comments. 167 The court's sole piece of evidence taken from this commissioned report is
the following claim: "One commenter, for example, submitted an empirical study
showing that 'when dissident directors win board seats, those firms underperform peers
by 19% to 40% over the two years following the proxy contest.' 168
The court misstates the evidence. Buckberg and Macey, the authors of the purported
empirical study, did not submit an empirical study of their own. Instead, they simply
summarized the results of three other studies. 16 9 Moreover, these three studies are far

159. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150.
160. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,760-64 (Sept. 16,
2010).
161. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150.
162. Id. at 1151.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,760 n.911).
165. Id.
166. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (citing to ELAINE BUCKBERG & JONATHAN MACEY, NERA
ECONOMIC CONSULTING, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF PROPOSED SEC RULE 14A- 11 ON EFFICIENCY,
COMPETITIVENESS, AND CAPITAL FORMATION: IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS BY BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE 9-10
(2009), availableat http://www.nera.com/upload/BuckbergMaceyReport-FINAL.pdf).
167. Press Release, Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs., NERA Report Cited by DC Circuit Court of Appeals in
Striking Down 'Dodd-Frank' Proxy Access Rule (July 26, 2011), available at http://www.nera.com/
83_7378.htm ("Dr. Buckberg and Professor Macey's Report on Effects of Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 on
Efficiency, Competitiveness and Capital Formation was originally prepared on behalf of the Business
Roundtable and was submitted in the original rulemaking comment period, which ended in August 2009.").
168. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (citing BUCKBERG & MACEY, supranote 166, at 9).
169. See BUCKBERG & MACEY, supra note 166, at 9 (citing Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The
Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An EmpiricalAnalysis ofPost-Contest Control Changes andFirm
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from conclusive about the effects of proxy access on firm performance. First, all the data
from the three studies come from proxy contests that occurred prior to 1990.170 The
market's perspective on proxy activity has changed significantly over time, and data from
the 1960s and 1970s may well not be representative of activity 25, 30, or 40 years
later. 17 1 Second, these studies vary in terms of their empirical results. Ikenberry and
Lakonishok do find significant negative returns at 24 months when dissidents are
successful; however, the negative results are strongest when dissidents capture a majority
of the board, 172 which cannot happen through Rule 14a- 1l.173 Borstadt and Zwirlein, in
contrast, find a 28% drop in cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for dissident
victories, 174 but the statistical significance is low, given the relatively small sample
size.1 75 In addition, the 24-month point is the nadir; the CAR result improves to -16% at
36 months. 176 Fleming's results are significantly more negative if the dissidents are
appointed to their board seats (-24.72%) than if the dissidents are elected to their seats (13.95%).177 Fleming also notes that "the removal of a few observations would be enough
to eliminate [the] statistical significance in the observed decline." 1 78 Finally, all three
studies do not see their empirical results as conclusive evidence that proxy contests
destroy firm value. Ikenberry and Lakonishok note that proxy contests follow a period of
deteriorating firm value: the five-year growth in these firms' operating income is 75%
below that of the control firms. 179 They find the post-proxy results to be "unexpected and
puzzling," and note that the evidence "suggests that shareholders are not rational when

Performance, 21 FIN. MGMT. 22, 28 (1992); David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance
Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. Bus. 405, 420 (1993); Michael Fleming, New
Evidence on the Effectiveness of the Proxy Mechanism 4 tbl.1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N. Y., Research Paper No.
9503, 1995), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/research papers/9503.pdf). As
Steven Davidoff has pointed out:
Ms. Buckberg and Mr. Macey merely state in their letter that they are summarizing the aggregate
results of three other studies from the early 1990s that examine companies from the 1960s to 1988.
In this light, it is hard to see what the D.C. Circuit's complaint is since it does not appear that the
judges even looked at these underlying studies to assess their relevance.
Davidoff, supra note 8.
170. See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 169, at 24 (examining proxy contests from 1962 through 1986);
Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 169, at 408 (examining contests between 1968 and 1988); Fleming, supra
note 169, at 4 (examining contests from 1977 through 1988).
171. Cf Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 342 (2005)
("The revolution in corporate law has been so thorough and profound that those working in the field today
would have considerable difficulty recognizing what it was twenty-five to thirty years ago.").
172. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 169, at 421 (finding cumulative abnormal return of -28.6% when
dissidents gain at least one seat, versus -41.6% when dissidents gain control).
173. Rule 14a- 1l, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- 1l (2011), vacated by Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (limiting the percentage of seats to 25% of the seats
up for election, and requiring nominating shareholders to disclaim any interest in capturing control).
174. Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 169, at 30, exhibit 6.
175. Id. at 29 ("Although the magnitude of the CAR is large at the annual intervals, the statistical
significance is low.").
176. Id.
177. Fleming, supranote 169, at 17.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 169, at 432.
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they cast their proxies." 180 In the alternative, Ikenberry and Lakonishok hypothesize that
proxy contests may create overoptimism by investors and analysts, leading to
disappointing returns. 181 If the firm is worse off than expected, dissidents may not be
able to solve the firm's significant problems. This theory is seconded by Borstadt and
Zwirlein, who suggest that "[i]t may be that dissidents are more likely to win control of
firms that are in very bad operating shape," and that after they succeed at the ballot box,
dissidents may have "little hope of saving an already sinking ship."1 82 Moreover, these
results do not prevent Borstadt and Zwirlein from being overall sanguine about proxy
contests; they found "positive and significant abnormal returns realized over the proxy
contest period for firms that were not later taken over."1 83 These abnormal gains were not
lost in the post-contest period.1 84
The foregoing discussion is meant to demonstrate the complexities in using this
group of empirical studies to enjoin the SEC's proxy-access rule. There are questions as
to the sample size of dissident victories; issues of the relevance of proxy battles from the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; and disagreement as to the meaning of the results that were
found. And these are the studies that Buckberg and Macey relied upon in making the case
against proxy access's positive impact on firm performance. Other studies, published in a
prestigious peer-review financial journal, have found that proxy contests increase firm
value. 185 And regardless of how these studies shake out, they are all examining
180. Id. at 433.
18 1. Id.
182. Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 169, at 30.
183. Id. at 31. In fact, the Borstadt and Zwirlein article is cited in a number of articles as evidence for the
positive effects of proxy contests. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise,93 VA. L. REV.
675, 712 n.68 (2007) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the proposition that "empirical studies consistently found
that proxy fights are associated with accompanying increase in shareholder wealth"); Roberta Romano, Less Is
More: Making InstitutionalInvestorActivism a Valuable Mechanismfor Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON
REG. 174, 182 n.20 (2001) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the proposition that "proxy fights are not typically
waged over marginal matters, and the empirical literature has consistently identified significant positive wealth
effects from this activity").
184. Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 169, at 31. Fleming similarly found that the threat of a proxy contest
was associated with significant increases in firm value when the contest had not been announced. Fleming,
supra note 169, at 10-11 tbl.4.
185. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held
Corporations,23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 30 (1989); Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On CorporateGovernance: A
Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1983); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy
Contests and Corporate Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 280 (1998).
Neither the SEC nor the Business Roundtable court discussed a set of empirical studies designed to test whether
the market thought that the SEC's proposal was a good idea. Two studies found that markets reacted negatively
to the proposal. See Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholdersin the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC's Proposal
to Facilitate Nominations, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1526081; David F. Larcker et al., The Regulation of Corporate Governance (May 3,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/TheRegulation-of-Corporate-Governance Larcker.pdf. However, the methodologies of these studies have been
criticized. See Fisch, supra note 9, at 477 n.254 ("A combination of problematic coding decisions and
confounding events raises serious doubts about the studies' empirical claims."). In addition, another study that
came out after the regulation was enacted but before Business Roundtable found that firms that would have
been most affected by the proxy access rule lost shareholder value when the SEC decided to delay
implementation of the rule. See Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?
Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge 33 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-052, Jan. 19,
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something that, while similar, is not identical to what the SEC is proposing in this rule.
Any study of shareholder-self-funded proxy challenges is not directly comparable to Rule
14a-l 1. So, no empirical research of those proxy contests can be definitive. Moreover,
studies that go beyond proxy contests in the prior century may also be instructive-what
role should they play? Proponents of Rule 14a- 11 marshaled empirical support for
increasing shareholder power as a way to unlock greater share value. 186 This body of
empirical research is voluminous compared to the proxy contest studies discussed by the
court, and its findings are arguably more relevant to Rule 14a- 11 than the limited proxy
contest research.
Respected legal academics have criticized Rule 14a-1 1 largely for its
ineffectuality. 187 Using empirical evidence about participation and share holdings, they
have recounted the limitations on proxy access through Rule 11-three-percent
ownership for three years-and noted the shallowness of this pool of potential proxyaccess users. 188 Moreover, the assumptions upon which the limitations are based-for
example, that longer term shareholders have a better sense of the company's interests
over time-have themselves been challenged empirically. 189 But the SEC recognized the
limitations of its rule and provided a justification for the rule's particular balancing of
competing considerations. 190 These normative choices are endemic. For example, while
the three-year rule may seem arbitrary, so would any rule drawing some line based on the
length of the holding. But the notion that the 2008 financial crisis was caused in part by
short-term profit maximization has received enough academic and popular support to
support policies based on this justification.1 9 1
Thus, the fundamental error in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Business Roundtable is
the presumption that the Commission must have more than "mixed" empirical research in
2012), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-052.pdf. The study was discussed in late 2010. See
Steven M. Davidoff, The Heated Debate over Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/1 1/02/the-heated-debate-over-proxy-access/.
There is a meta-analysis
question about these studies, even assuming that one or the other side is correct: namely, why should we accord
special significance to the market's views at any particular time about the effects of the rule? Given the timing
of these studies and their focus, we do not fault the SEC for failing to consider them. But see Fisch, supra note
9, at 477-78 (attributing the failure to consider these studies as a potential "sandbagging" by the SEC of its
economic analysis).
186. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,761 n.914 (Sept.
16, 2010) (noting commentator-submitted studies that demonstrated the "salutary deterrent effects against board
complacency," which resulted from measures implemented to make incumbent directors more vulnerable to
replacement by shareholder action).
187. Fisch, supra note 9, at 482 (finding that the SEC chose to enact a rule with "no consequences");
Kahan & Rock, supranote 9, at 1431-33.
188. Fisch, supra note 9, at 458-66; Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1420-25.
189. See Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors andEquity Returns: Are Short-Term
Institutions Better Informed?, 22 REv. FIN. STUD. 893, 920-22 (2009) (finding that trading activity by shortterm institutional investors provides a reliable forecast of future returns), cited in Fisch, supra note 9, at 464
n.183.
190. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,688-93.
191. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 629 (2011)
("Among the competing theories on the cause of the financial collapse-the over-dependence on derivatives,
the overuse of leverage, the culture of greed and entitlement in the finance industry, just to name a few-a focus
on the short term is an omnipresent narrative thread.").
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order to justify its rule. 192 Without the rule being enacted in a parallel universe to our
own, there will never be empirical evidence that is more than "mixed" on this issue. 193
Academics, of course, should delve into the weeds to determine whether a particular
study chose the proper sample size, controlled for the appropriate variables, and reached
the right conclusions based on the data. But when academics using proper research
methods have come to conflicting conclusions about empirical results, it is quixotic for
agencies and courts to endeavor to find one true answer. The SEC sorted through the
research to make a case for proxy access while acknowledging the limitations of that
research. 194 The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, found the rule "not sufficiently supported" by
the empirical data based on its own cursory review of a commissioned summary. 19 5 The
contrast is striking. The Business Roundtable opinion demonstrates not only a failure to
analyze the relevant research, but also a failure to understand the limits of applying that
research to the question at hand.
B. Bad Theory
The SEC's justification for Rule 14a- 11 is based partially on empirics, but mostly on
theory. The empirical case, discussed above, 196 is that shareholders' holdings improve
when shareholders bring proxy challenges against underperforming boards. The law and
economics theory behind this empirical evidence is that the board (and its appointed
officers), despite being the elected representatives of the shareholders, may fail to serve
shareholder interests effectively. Shareholders suffer agency costs from having a group
with potentially differing concerns, as well as variable levels of competency, make
decisions on their behalf. The ability of shareholders to choose their representatives is
thus critical in mitigating agency costs and ensuring that the corporation is run in the
interests of the shareholders. 197

192. See Davidoff, supra note 8 ("In truth, there is no definitive empirical evidence on this issue and it is
likely [there] will not be any. The issue of how and when director nominations influence boards is probably
impossible to empirically prove without doubt. But the D.C. Circuit opinion seems to require such empirical
proof.").
193. One professor supported the rule, insomuch as it would provide data going forward as to its
BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010),
efficiency. Eric Talley, Proxy Access Forum, CONGLOMERATE
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/08/viewed-through-the-lens-of-editorial-pages-wednesdays-rulechangewas-a-watershed-event-shareholder-activists-have-been-c.html ("Some rule changes-and particularly
non-voluntary rule changes such as the new Rule 14a-1-have the potential merit of creating natural
experiments that add to the stock of information for future researchers, policy makers, regulators and investors.
That dynamic value may justify their adoption in close cases, even if one's knee-jerk judgment-based
exclusively on currently available static information-would tilt ambivalently towards preserving the status
quo. At the very least, if we're genuinely interested in maximizing 'long term shareholder value' (a topic that
may be ripe for another debate, another time), the benefit of modest regulatory experimentation deserves a seat
at the prescriptive table.").
194. See, e.g., Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,760 n.911 (noting the
empirical evidence suggesting that "'companies with dissidents on their boards perform better than their peers
over a one-year period,"' but also noting the lack of standard errors and the weak predictive power of such
studies over a longer timeline).
195. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
196. See supraPart III.A.
197. The Delaware Chancery has characterized the right to vote more in terms of legitimacy than economic
efficiency:
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In theory, shareholders would enforce their will on their representatives as most
electorates do: through elections. Shareholders generally vote every year for the entire
board. 198 If the directors were acting out of self-interest or doing a poor job running the
company, the shareholders could simply elect a different set of candidates who would,
hopefully, do a better job. However, it has proven difficult to turn this relatively
straightforward theory into reality. The foundational work of modern corporate law
established the paradigm of separation of ownership from control: namely, the separation
of shareholders from managers. 199 And the basic work of corporate law and economics
further develops these ideas through the concept of the nexus of contracts and the
difficulty of agency costs.200 The important developments in corporate law theory and
practice have almost all concerned efforts to resolve this tension between shareholder
primacy and managerial control.
Shareholders face several critical challenges in proposing candidates outside of
those nominated by the incumbent board. First, shareholders face the problem of the
commons: any time, money, or initiative they expend in improving the company will
redound to the benefit of the whole. If the shareholder owns 100% of the company, she
will capture 100% of the fruits of her labor. However, if she only owns one percent-a
huge sum for most public companies-she will carry all the costs but only capture one
percent of the benefits. Unless she expects to earn back those costs, it is economically
irrational for the one-percent shareholder to expend any time or money on improving the
company, even if the overall gains would dwarf the individual costs.20 1 Second,
shareholders under the current system face much higher costs in nominating candidates
than do the incumbent board members. In order to run for a director position, any
candidate outside of the board's official proxy process must essentially create her own
ballots and then provide them to shareholders to use in the voting process. There is no
uniform ballot; instead, "outside" candidates provide their own proxies and disclose the
information required by federal securities regulation. These proxies must then be sent to

The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial
power rests . . . . It has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the stockholder vote as a
vestige or ritual of little practical importance . . . . [W]hether the vote is seen functionally as an
unimportant formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the
theory that legitimated the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast
aggregations of property that they do not own.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
198. Staggered boards are an exception; directors on staggered boards have two or three year terms, and
generally are up for reelection on a rotating basis.
199. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
4(1932).
200. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 137; see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW, at xii (1993) (asserting that, "[e]ver since Berle and Means, the central issue of corporate law
has been how to create a legal structure that monitors management").

201. To illustrate this: shareholder Xowns one percent of Company YInc., a company worth $100 million.
IfXruns for the board of directors and implements reforms to the business, YInc. will increase in value by 20%
to $120 million. However, X would only capture $200 thousand of those gains. If X's costs to secure the seat are
more than $200 thousand, Xwill not pursue those reforms, even though the company would increase in value by
$20 million.
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all shareholders who are eligible to vote. 202 These substantial costs mean that most
shareholders never nominate candidates, even if those candidates would be superior
directors. The math is simple: the board gets its proxy ballot paid for by the corporation,
but board opponents do not. That is why proxy ballot access for shareholders has been on
the SEC's radar screen for most of its existence. Proxy access reduces the costs of
participation, which makes it more likely that shareholders will participate more actively
203
in governance. The theory is fairly straightforward.
How does the D.C. Circuit's Business Roundtable v. SEC opinion refute this basic
economic theory? The court made two counterarguments. First, it found that the
Commission had underappreciated the costs that incumbent boards would incur in trying
to defeat the "dissident" shareholder nominees. Second, the court argued that Rule 14a-1 1
would cater to union and state pension funds who would use the process to badger for
reforms unrelated to overall shareholder value.
Regarding the incumbent board's campaign costs, the Commission recognized that
"it can reasonably be expected that the boards of some companies likely would oppose
the election of shareholder director nominees." 204 It also cited to commenters who
2 05
suggested that the costs of proxy contests ranged from $800,000 to $14 million.
However, the Commission noted that these costs were not required under Rule 14a- 11,
and that boards might very well choose to expend fewer resources. This contention drew
the ire of the court, which found that "the Commission's prediction directors might
206
choose not to oppose shareholder nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation."
The court recognized that, under economic theory, a rational board will forgo an
expensive proxy campaign "if it believes the cost of opposition would exceed the cost to
the company of the board's preferred candidate losing the election, discounted by the
probability of that happening." 207 But the court acceded to the logic of the American Bar
Association Committee of Federal Regulation of Securities, which essentially argued that
20 8
boards will always have a fiduciary duty to fiercely oppose shareholder nominees.
How so? Well, the committee argued that if the board determines that the shareholder
nominee is not as good as the board's nominee, then the board "will be compelled by its
202. Establishing the eligible voters require assistance from the corporation, as the electorate is determined
based on the record date for the particular election.
203. Lee Harris has argued that the results of corporate elections are based not on the directors' ability to
enhance shareholder value, but rather on the amount they spend on the campaign. Lee Harris, The Politics of
Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1761, 1782-87 (2011). He maintains that true reform would require
some system of subsidizing campaign expenses for challengers, akin to public financing for political elections.
Id. at 1807; see also Lee Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds: A Campaign Subsidy Scheme for Corporate
Elections, 58 UCLA L. REv. 167, 167 (2010) (arguing that "incumbents always have the upper hand" and that
the corporate election system is "in need of significant reform"). In addition, Yair Listokin has found an
abnormal number of incumbent board victories in his study of close elections, suggesting some form of
advantage for incumbents. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
159, 161-62 (2008).
204. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,284, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,770 (Sept. 16,
2010).
205. Id.
206. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
207. Id.
208. Id.
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fiduciary duty to make an appropriate effort to oppose the nominee." 2 09 But-of
course-in every instance, the shareholder nominee will be someone who was not chosen
by the board as its nominee. So according to the court, the incumbent board has a
fiduciary duty to campaign vigorously against any and all "dissident" nominees, because
the incumbent nominees will always be better for the corporation.
At this point it is helpful to take a step back and remind ourselves of the underlying
enterprise. Rule 14a- 11allows shareholders to save the costs in buying their own proxy
materials by using the company's proxy materials instead. It thus may facilitate such
nominees and thereby increase their number. But Rule 14a-11 does not change the
underlying fact of the elections themselves; shareholders have always been free to run
proxy contests against the board's nominees, and the board has always been free to use
the corporate coffers for its campaign-within the limits proscribed by fiduciary duty. 2 10
To that extent, the Commission is correct when it characterizes the costs of campaign as
inherent in the underlying elections required by state corporate law. 2 11
In fact, by making it easier for shareholders to participate in elections, Rule 14a-1 1
may, somewhat counter-intuitively, decrease the number of contested elections.
Corporate boards never have to wait for disgruntled shareholders to challenge them in an
election in order to address shareholder concerns. They can, instead, mollify potential
rivals by being more alert and responsive to shareholder concerns that might prompt a
fight. Or boards might even opt to include shareholder nominees on their own slates.
Making the corporate governance system more responsive could very well encourage
self-interested corporate board members-as it has for generations of politicians-to pay
a little closer attention to the desires of the electorate. And while there might be dangers
to an overresponsive system of governance, that really isn't of any concern here with the
limitations built into Rule 14a-l 1 challenges.
And even if corporate management ends up having to deal with more contested
elections under Rule 14a- 11, that alone should not have troubled the court. Focusing on
the costs of the election for the incumbents is like focusing on the costs of political
campaigns to incumbents in assessing whether we want to facilitate challenges to the
incumbents. Electoral campaigns allow for competition between rival candidates to
choose the best possible nominee. Yes, it would be less costly if we just declared the
incumbent the winner-but that would defeat the point of having an election in the first
place.

209. Id. (quoting Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Am. Bar Ass'n, to SEC 35
(Aug. 31, 2009), availableat http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-456.pdf).
210. According to Delaware law, "where reasonable expenditures are in the interest of an intelligent
exercise of judgment on the part of the stockholders upon policies to be pursued, the expenditures are proper;
but where the expenditures are solely in the personal interest of the directors to maintain themselves in office,
expenditures made in their campaign for proxies are not proper." Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen
Corp., 171 A. 226, 228 (Del. Ch. 1934). As the court acknowledged in that case, "difficulty is often bound to
arise when it is sought in such cases as this to draw the line between what is proper and what is improper." Id.;
see also Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (finding improper
moneys spent on personal power, individual gain, or private advantage and on expenditures not believed to be
in the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation).
211. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62, 764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,770 (Sept. 16,
2010) (addressing increased costs of proxy contests).
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Unlike the Commission, 2 12 the court does not endeavor to take into account the
overall costs and benefits of the rule. It instead simply claims that the Commission failed
to take sufficient account of the costs that incumbent boards would incur in fighting for
their nominees. 2 13 But the court never mentions the much larger potential benefits that
shareholders would get from having more competitive elections. Shareholders elect
directors. It is the key structural element of shareholder primacy, which is the theoretical
foundation for the law and economics of corporate law. Yet Business Roundtable v. SEC
treats a contested election as a cost to be bome by the incumbent board, rather than a
critical component of corporate governance.
Let us say it again-shareholder elections have been a cornerstone not only of
corporate law doctrine, but in fact of the law and economics perspective on corporate law
doctrine. In order for the board to align its interests with those of the shareholders, the
electoral process needs to work. Shareholder preferences need to be meaningfully
reflected in electoral outcomes. Law and economics scholars have worked at designing
ways for shareholders to have a stronger voice in the process in order to facilitate
shareholder wealth maximization. The need for the incumbent board to protect itself
against shareholder insurgents has never been high on the agenda. The fact that an
incumbent board can reimburse itself at all for its campaign expenses is a somewhat
controversial one. 2 14 Rather than noting that Rule 14a-l 1 would reduce costs for
shareholders in exercising their right to nominate candidates, the Business Roundtable
court emphasizes the costs boards will have to expend in fighting them off.
Why does the court reject basic economic theory in favor of supporting incumbent
boards? Perhaps because the court is predisposed to think that the shareholder nominees
who will take advantage of Rule 14a-1 1 deserve to be defeated. In our view, the crux of
the court's opinion is its section on "Shareholders with Special Interests"-namely,
"unions and state and local governments whose interests in jobs may well be greater than
their interest in share value." 2 15 Because of their "special" interests, the court fears that
such shareholders will use Rule 14a-11 to "pursue self-interested objectives rather than
the goal of maximizing shareholder value, and will likely cause companies to incur costs
even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected." 2 16 The court accused the
Commission of acting arbitrarily by "ducking serious evaluation of the costs that could be
2 17
imposed . . . by shareholders representing special interests."

212. Id. at 56,754-71.
213. It is not really clear from the opinion what the court actually wanted from the Commission here. The
court "agree[d] with the petitioners that the Commission's prediction directors might choose not to oppose
shareholder nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation." Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150. However, the
Commission suggested this was a mitigating possibility; it did not suggest that incumbent boards would forego
proxy campaigns. Instead, the Commission only argued that the costs might be limited. Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,770. Although the court cited the petitioners' claim that the failure to
estimate the exact costs of such campaigns was arbitrary, the court did not specifically endorse this claim. Bus.
Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149-50.
214.

See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESs

ORGANIZATION 186 (2d ed. 2007) ("[A]uthorizing the board to expend corporate funds on its own re-election
seems to permit a kind of self-dealing.").
215. Bus. Roundtable,647 F.3d at 1151-52.
216. Id. at 1152.
217. Id.
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For a court that had earlier been so concerned with empirical support, the claim that
union and pension fund shareholders will use their shares to pursue special interests is
laughably lacking such support. As its authority, the court cites to the comments from the
Business Roundtable itself, which provided the following quote: "[S]tate governments
and labor unions .. . often appear to be driven by concerns other than a desire to increase
the economic performance of the companies in which they invest." 2 18 The quote is taken
from an article by the Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. 2 19 The article does
not provide a footnote for this statement, and the Chancellor cites no authority in support
of the proposition. The claim itself is rather couched, qualified by "often appear to be." In
fact, the Chancellor wrote the entire article not from his own perspective, but rather as a
missive based upon the fictionalized perspective of an "open-minded corporate law
'traditionalist."' 2 20 As Chancellor Strine emphasized, "[t]hat viewpoint should not be
confused as representing my own." 22 1 Regardless of whether this is meant to present an
unreliable narrator, 222 it certainly makes the article an exercise in rhetoric. It seems fairer
to say that Chancellor Strine's statement is something that the traditionalist would
believe-not necessarily something grounded in demonstrated reality. 223 The phrase
"appear to be" echoes this notion.
The bogeyman of unions and pension funds running amok is popular in a certain
segment of corporate law literature. 224 However, it is similarly unsubstantiated there. The
most common example of "special" shareholders using their power to affect firm
218. Id. (citing Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable on the ProposedElection Contest Rules and
the Proposed Amendment to the Shareholder Proposal Rules, Bus. ROUNDTABLE 102 (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/hearings-letters/downloads/BRTCommentLetter-to SEC-onFileNo
S7-10-09.pdf).
219. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A TraditionalistResponse to Bebchuk's
Solution for Improving CorporateAmerica, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006). At the time of the article's
publication, Chancellor Strine was a vice chancellor.
220. Id. at 1759.
22 1. Id.
222.

See, e.g., AGATHA CHRISTIE, THE MURDER OF ROGER ACKROYD (Dodd, Mead & Co. ed., Bantam

Books 1983) (1926).
223. See also J. Robert Brown, Jr., ShareholderAccess and Uneconomic Economic Analysis: Business
Roundtable v. SEC, DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.denverlawreview.org/onlinethat
(noting
articles/2011/9/30/shareholder-access-and-uneconomic-economic-analysis-business.html
Chancellor Strine "was commenting on differences among shareholders, not the use of access").
224.

See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 229

(2008) ("Public employee pension funds are vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for advancing political/social
goals of the fund trustees that are unrelated to shareholder interests generally."); Joseph A. Grundfest, The
SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 Bus. LAW. 361, 378-83 (2010)
(singling out labor unions and public pension funds as special-interest shareholders); Romano, supra note 183,
at 231-32 (arguing that union and public pension fund managers use shareholder proposals to accrue "private
benefits"); Larry Ribstein, The "Shareholder Democracy" Scam, IDEOBLOG (Oct. 27, 2006),
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the shareholder.html ("It should be obvious to anybody who
cares to look past the rhetoric that the unions are seeking bargaining leverage on behalf of their members, and to
ensure their own survival. They are not seeking to represent the interests of investors generally."); Mark J. Roe,
The CorporateShareholder'sVote and Its PoliticalEconomy, in Delaware and Washington 30 (Harvard Law
Sch., Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-94, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1884110 (referring to "agenda-driven activists, such as
CalPERS and other state pension funds, as having pernicious and costly side-agendas" apart from those of
"financial" shareholders).
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governance-in a way that harms other shareholders-is the campaign by CalPERS and
the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) to withhold shareholder support for
certain Safeway directors. 225 The campaign allegedly targeted these directors because of
Safeway's hard-line negotiations with the UFCW. In the end, however, only 17% of the
shares voted against the targeted directors. 226
The CalPERS-Safeway example has been used over and over to demonstrate the
potential for unions and pension funds to pressure boards into caving to labor
demands. 22 7 But the example itself demonstrates the lack of such potential. CalPERS and
the other pension funds involved had legitimate corporate governance concerns to raise
along with their union-oriented concerns; they did not nakedly assert nonshareholder
interests. 22 8 Indeed, why would they?-they were also shareholders. Their exercise of
power netted only 17% of the total shareholder vote, and also led to the ouster of the
CalPERS chair who had orchestrated the campaign. 229 The situation was, in fact, a total
catastrophe for CalPERS. It is hardly evidence that unions and pension funds will
exercise their ballot box power to crush their fellow shareholders. Moreover, beyond this
anecdote, the evidence is that union and pension fund shareholders have been aligned
with their fellow shareholders in seeking corporate governance reforms. 230

225. See Grundfest, supranote 224, at 382-83.
226. Id. at 383. Moreover, the directors would have still been reelected, even if a majority had voted to
withhold their votes.
227. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 224; Anabtawi, supra note 141, at 589-90; Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout,
Fiduciary Dutiesfor Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1285-86 (2008); Jill E. Fisch, Securities
Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 883 (2010);
Grundfest, supra note 224, at 382-83; John F. Olson, Reflections on a Visit to Leo Strine's PeaceableKingdom,
33 J. CORP. L. 73, 76-77 (2007); Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2493, 2524-25 (2005);
J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware'sFuture Reviewing Company Defenses
in the Era of Dodd-Frank,36 J. CORP. L. 391, 397 (2011); David H. Webber, Is "Pay-to-Play"Driving Public
Pension FundActivism in Securities Class Actions? An EmpiricalStudy, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2071 (2010).
228. Marc Lifsher, CalPERS to Withhold Votes on Safeway CEO, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004,
http://articles.latimcs.com/2004/apr/08/business/fi-calpers8 ("CaIPERS said it would withhold its votes for
Safeway Chairman and Chief Executive Steven Burd because of a 60% drop in Safeway's stock since early
2001 that the pension fund said wiped out $20 billion in market value. CalPERS officials also cited what they
described as conflicts of interest and a lack of responsiveness to shareholder concerns.").
229. Tom Petruno, Business Applauds Shake-up at CaIPERS, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004,
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/02/business/fi-governance2.
230. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: ShareholderActivism
by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018, 1019-20 (1998) ("In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or
proletarian plot in what unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large
institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital."). However, an empirical study did find that
AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders are more likely to support director nominees by the incumbent board once the
AFL-CIO no longer represents workers at a given firm. See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance
Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187 (2012).
Agrawal argues that this divergence represents governance objectives that are "motivated by union labor
interests rather than equity value maximization alone." Id. at 188. The study focused on the time at which the
Change to Win coalition of unions split off from the AFL-CIO, and examined the behavior of AFL-CIO funds
with respect to directors at Change to Win companies. Id. Overall, Agrawal found that the AFL-CIO funds
voted for director nominees 65% of the time and a Change to Win union (the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America (UBCJA)) voted for director nominees 55% of the time, while three different index
funds supported the director nominees between 89% to 98% of the time. Id. at 195 tbl.l. Agrawal assumes,
however, that the index funds' votes reflect a policy of shareholder wealth maximization. He does not
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There is a reason why "special interest" shareholders have supported reforms that
support overall shareholder value rather than their special interests: the reforms would not
otherwise be enacted. Efforts by one group of shareholders to elect a director that would
cater to their unique interests would be met with indifference or hostility from their
fellow shareholders. The Business Roundtable court fails to explain how union and
pension fund shareholders could ever use Rule 14a- 11 to elect special-interest directors
without majority support. The numbers do not add up. There are only two alternatives:
(1) shareholders will irrationally vote against their interests, or (2) special-interest
candidates will consistently lose. The court presents no theory as to an irrational
electorate, but does contend that a corporation may incur costs even without shareholder
victories. It raises the specter of a board "succumbing to the demands, unrelated to
increasing value, of a special interest shareholder threatening to nominate a director." 23 1
However, it cites no instances of such a power play, nor does it explain why in theory a
board would cave. The court also notes that special-interest shareholders "will likely
cause companies to incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected." 232
However, the court does not explain why shareholders would send up nominees unlikely
to be elected, other than to impose costs (which is, of course, against all shareholder
interests, including their own). Although Rule 14a- 11 reduces the costs of nominating
director candidates, it does not eliminate them entirely, and it would be economically
irrational for special-interest shareholders to incur repeated nomination costs if the result
is consistent electoral defeat.233
Thus, the court's decision in Business Roundtable rests on economic theory that: (a)
discounts the importance of the shareholder vote in corporate governance; (b) looks only
at the campaign costs to incumbents when calculating the overall efficiency of the
shareholder franchise; (c) assumes directors will act irrationally in the face of challenges;
demonstrate why a vote for incumbent directors equals a vote for shareholder wealth maximization beyond their
support from index funds.
231. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144,1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
232. Id
233. Joseph Grundfest has provided a theory (unmentioned by the Business Roundtable court) arguing that
union and pension fund shareholders could use Rule 14a- 11as a "megaphone" to get across their message and,
in some cases, secure concessions from sensitive boards. Grundfest, supra note 224. Grundfest asserts that these
shareholders can use the nomination process to gain additional publicity "at very little cost" and "need not even
come close to winning." Id. at 379. He cites to the "significant press coverage" that the first proxy access
candidates will get, or that will accrue to those candidates touting "controversial or novel proposals." Id We
think that this concern is overstated and, at best, short-term. It would eventually be self-defeating. However, it is
instructive (and perhaps eye-opening) to see the parade of horribles that Grundfest trots out:
Consider a board candidate who wants to limit the export of jobs to foreign factories, or to close
down foreign factories in order to bring manufacturing jobs back to America. Consider a candidate
who wants to cap all executive salaries at a multiple of the average hourly wage of the rank and
file. Consider a candidate who wants the company voluntarily to comply with emissions standards
that reduce global warming but that place the corporation at a competitive disadvantage in the
marketplace.
Id. at 381. Grundfest also alludes to the possibility that "eggshell directors" will collapse under the pressure of a
dissident campaign and offer meaningful concessions to make the campaign go away. Id. at 382-83. His only
example is Safeway-a failure-and his theory requires that directors will act irrationally to stave off some
level of PR discomfort. Grundfest, supra note 224, at 382-83. Perhaps such eggshells should not be on the
board to begin with.
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and (d) assumes "special-interest" shareholders will irrationally waste their own and the
corporation's money in pursuit of fruitless campaigns. This collection of theories departs
dramatically from the standard law and economics of corporate law, which assumes that
shareholders and directors will act rationally, that agency costs are a natural byproduct of
the separation of ownership and control, and that the shareholder franchise will increase
overall efficiency. 234 Why does the Business Roundtable court-a court that ostensibly
seeks to vindicate law and economics principles in its decision-depart so dramatically
from law and economics foundations? Part V offers our theory.
V. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE PURPOSE OF DEMOCRACY
Business Roundtable reveals just how far some law and economics adherents have
drifted from their own basic precepts. They actually distrust a more robust corporate
democracy because the electoral outcomes are more likely to reflect underlying
shareholder preferences. In a world of stifled democracy, theoreticians can make
judgments about what the people would "really" want if they were freely able to express
those preferences. So it was with the law and economics of corporate law: the "nexus of
contract" theory was used to justify the existence of certain contractual features in the
corporate landscape, while the "hypothetical contract" was used to justify the mandatory,
non-contractual foundations. 23 5 Similarly, the notion of "shareholder homogeneity"
enabled corporate law theorists to speak broadly about what shareholders (as a whole)
would want.2 36 If all shareholders are the same-or, at least, want the same things out of
their shares-then the vote itself becomes almost secondary.
As has become increasingly clear, however, shareholders are not homogenous. 23 7 A
variety of different shareholder "types"-majority shareholders, shareholders with
disproportionate voting rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged
shareholders, government shareholders, employee and management shareholders-have
unique interests apart from their shareholder compadres. 238 Moreover, shareholders differ
with respect to their definition of wealth maximization. A hedge fund looking for a quick
return is different than an index fund looking to stay in the stock as long as it is listed. A
deeply invested shareholder seeking to maximize the value of this individual stock is
different than a portfolio investor. 239 Shareholders might have conflicting opinions as to
234. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 66-72 (defending the shareholder franchise);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 441 (finding that "as a consequence of both logic and experience,
there is convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social
welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct
terms, only to those interests").
235. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of "Nexus of
Contract" Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1131-32 (2011) (reviewing LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION (2010)).
236. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 70 (emphasizing that shareholders are likely
to have "similar if not identical" interests because "the shareholders of a given firm at a given time are a
reasonably homogenous group").
237. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 477-98.
238. Id. at 477-92.
239. Some commentators have suggested a normative system of portfolio wealth maximization, rather than
share wealth maximization. Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a
World with DiversifiedShareholders/Consumers,31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 44 (1996); see also
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business and strategic decisions that shape the corporation's present and future. 240 And
the notion that shareholders have a shared interest in wealth maximization is a
simplifying assumption. Shareholders are heterogeneous with respect to their utility
preferences in that these preferences do not match up directly with wealth.
Shareholders-when assessed as individual people-all have individual utility
24
preferences that go beyond maximization of one's wealth. 1
When scholars contend that special interest shareholders may advance goals that are
unrelated to "shareholder interests generally," they put the cart before the horse. The
concept itself-"shareholder interests generally"-has no meaning until the preferences
of actual shareholders are aggregated through some electoral process. It's a mistake to
think that any one version of shareholder wealth maximization has priority over all the
others. It's a bigger mistake for a court to adopt that singular version and enforce it. And
it's simply bad economics to ignore large swaths of individual preferences when they
don't comply with a particular vision of the corporation. Standard economics instructs us
to take preferences as they come. In almost every other situation, law and economics
scholars positively fetishize individual preferences; here, they run away from them.
Simple reflection should reveal that, when it comes down to it, shareholders-like all
voters-do not simply vote for those who seek to advance "shareholder interests
generally." That, after all, is the board's job, and the way to keep it on task is to ensure
that the election process is at least somewhat responsive to actual shareholders. 242
Of course, if there is no avenue for expressing these diverse preferences, there is no
evidence of them on display. In closely held corporations, shareholders' preferences
conflict on a variety of levels: dividends, mergers, director seats, employment positions,
and business plans. And these preferences play out in shareholder votes and board
meetings. But the separation of ownership from control in public corporations has meant
that the shareholder franchise has failed to serve its governance functions. 243 If

Greenwood, supra note 147, at 1056-58 (discussing the differences between the "corporate law" fictional
shareholder and the "portfolio investor" shareholder).
240. For example, Hewlett-Packard shareholders recently battled over the wisdom of the merger between
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. Steve Lohr & Michael Brick, Hewlett-Packard Claims a Victory in
Hewlett-Compaq Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/20/business/
technology-hewlett-packard-claims-a-victory.html?pagewanted=all&src-pm. Hewlett-Packard director Walter
Hewlett battled the rest of the company's board and management over the merger, ultimately losing in a close
election. Id. Both sides agreed that the merger should be judged on its impact to Hewlett-Packard's success, but
they disagreed about whether the merger would help accomplish that goal. Id. Hewlett and the company spent
an estimated $100 million in their efforts to persuade shareholders. Id.
241. For an in-depth discussion of the role of efficiency in the law and economics of corporate law, see
generally Ellis & Hayden, supranote 57.
242. We have argued that the heterogeneity of shareholder preferences provides support for the notion that
the corporate franchise should expand to include corporate constituents beyond shareholders. See, e.g., Grant M.
Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, ShareholderDemocracy and the Curious Turn Toward BoardPrimacy, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 2071, 2120 (2010) (arguing that shareholder heterogeneity arguably supports expansion of the
franchise to nonshareholder constituents). Our argument here is not that nonshareholder constituents should be
excluded; rather, we are arguing that shareholders of all stripes and sizes should have their preferences taken
into account, even if some of these shareholders share common preferences with nonshareholder constituents.
The Business Roundtable court's rejection of Rule 14a-11 was not an effort to include other stakeholders; it was
rather an effort to exclude what it considered to be nonshareholders in shareholders' clothing.
243. Bebchuk, supra note 183, at 682-94 (describing the lack of effective shareholder voting power).
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shareholders cannot efficiently mount opposition campaigns for director positions, these
elections become exercises in rubber stamping. Rule 14a-1 1 was an attempt to break out
of this dysfunctional pattern. It endeavored to reduce the costs of competing for
directorships, and thereby encourage more candidates to enter the race.
We know from our basic review of preference aggregation that there are many ways
in which a voting system can fall short of its goal of producing outcomes that
meaningfully reflect the desires of relevant constituents. 244 Sometimes there are barriers,
both subtle and obvious, that prevent interested parties from voting. Sometimes the
system assigns weight to votes in a way that skews outcomes in a particular direction.
Sometimes votes are combined in ways that thwart the ability of certain groups of voters
to have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. And, in some cases,
voters are hindered in their ability to get their preferred candidates on the ballot during
the slating process. A defect in any aspect of a voting system has the ability to distort the
preference aggregating function of an election.
Even if contemporary corporate governance gets some things right (perhaps, for
example, "one share, one vote" properly captures both the identity and proper weighting
of corporate votes), it may still fall short when it comes to the slating process. A slating
process that unduly restricts the ability of candidates to make it onto a ballot is, generally,
a problem. 245 And when one of the principal justifications for that restriction is based on
the content of voter preferences, as it is in the case of "special interest" shareholders, we
can be certain that the results will be skewed in a particular direction, distorting the
preference aggregating function of the electoral process. In the political realm, we saw
that the Supreme Court sometimes viewed political stability in the form of preserving the
two-party system as an acceptable (though not uncontroversial) goal of state ballot access
laws. 246 But, the existing scheme of corporate governance-the one that Rulel4a-l 1 was
designed to modify-is nowhere close to suffering from the kind of unsteadiness that
might justify more restrictive access to the corporate ballot. Indeed, the current system
has all the stability (and democratic fairness) of a one-party state.
Which brings us to a little secret about those law and economics adherents who
believe in shareholder homogeneity: they do not want real shareholder democracy.
Shareholder wealth maximization is a fictional placeholder developed to replace the
actual interests of the shareholders. 247 If shareholders truly expressed their preferences
through their votes, there would be no need for the norm of residual maximization.
Instead, the board and management would be expected to follow the actual preferences of
shareholders, rather than simply a presumed wealth maximization preference. Thus, we
see the strange cycle that justifies the current stasis in shareholder democracy.
Shareholders, we are told, will single-mindedly focus on increasing the residual as their
sole preference for corporate policy. Because it is in the interests of all corporate
stakeholders that the residual be maximized, we should give power to those who have a
single-minded focus on such an outcome. 24 8 However, actual shareholders may not all
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agree on one homogenized goal. If let loose to express their actual preferences,
shareholders might express their preferences for a variety of interests beyond shareholder
wealth maximization. 249 Because shareholder preferences are irrelevant to shareholder
primacy, true shareholder democracy is actually a threat to the fictional shareholder
wealth maximization norm.
The Business Roundtable decision neatly illustrates this hostility. In its review of the
Commission's cost-benefit analysis, the court agreed that Rule 14a-11 "will mitigate
collective action and free rider concerns, which can discourage a shareholder from
exercising his right to nominate a director in a traditional proxy contest, and has the
potential of creating the benefit of improved shareholder value." 2 50 But the opinion never
returned to these notions. Instead, it turned to the concrete costs of democracy for the
incumbent board: namely, the costs of engaging in a meaningful board election, and the
potential for "special" shareholders to abuse their right to enter elections. 25 1 From the
court's perspective, democracy is a messy, expensive process in which outsiders may
crash the party and ruin the whole thing. The Commission's failure to recognize this was,
in the court's view, arbitrary and capricious. 25 2
But, of course, democracy is messy. Most, if not all, of us have been disappointed by
its results at various points in our lives. Some corporate law scholars have argued that
democracy should have only a minimal role to play in corporate governance, and that
directors should have the authority of Platonic guardians over their shareholder
subjects. 253 However, mainstream law and economics has long defended the critical role
of shareholder democracy within the overall framework of corporate govemance. 254
Shareholders need to hold directors accountable for failing to pursue shareholder
interests. Otherwise, the corporation will be riven with agency costs.

249. Greenwood, supra note 147, at 1052-53 ("If the corporation were run by and for real people, it would
be a hotbed of political controversy . . .. If the real people disagree with the fictional representation, the real
people may simply be disregarded as not real shareholders.").
250. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act Release
No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,756, 56,761 (Sept. 16,
2010)).
251. Idatl149-52.
252. Id. at 1152.
253. Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 560. Bainbridge supports the goal of shareholder wealth maximization
but argues against greater shareholder input. See id; Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1735, 1749 (2006). He bases his argument primarily on the need for
centralized and largely unreviewable discretion in order to maximize efficient business operations. Id.
Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to disrupt the very
mechanism that makes the widely held public corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of
essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The chief economic
virtue of the public corporation is . .. that it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure wellsuited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, managers,
shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies.
Id.
See also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 280 (1999) (discussing their "mediating hierarchs" approach to board leadership).
254. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 63 (arguing that "the structure of voting-who votes,
using what institutions-is contractual, and efficient, too").
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The split between the ideas of shareholder wealth maximization and shareholder
preference aggregation has led to the current split in the law and economics academy.
One camp maintains its faith that facilitating shareholder democracy will increase
corporate efficiency and reduce overall agency costs. 25 5 The other side now trusts the
hypothetical shareholder more than actual shareholders when it comes to pursuing
shareholder wealth maximization. Private equity funds which seek to buy out
shareholders at a premium are to be encouraged, but shareholders within the company
who want to exercise their democratic privileges are simply troublemakers. The D.C.
Circuit has placed itself firmly in the second camp-and, we believe, inappropriately so.
VI. CONCLUSION

Corporate law and economics scholarship has become adept at containing and
eliding certain contradictions as to its basic principles. Corporations are contracts, except
when they're not. 256 Shareholders all have the same interests, except when they don't.2 57
And shareholder voting maximizes utility, except when it doesn't.2 58 The analysis in
Business Roundtable provides a shoddy and simplified reflection of these principles; it
should perhaps not be surprising that the contradictions therefore appear a bit more
obvious.
It is one thing for scholars to debate contested issues using rival theories and
indeterminate empirical data. It is quite another for the judiciary to strike down a
regulation-one specifically endorsed by statute-based on one side's version of the
theory and data. The Business Roundtable decision has ensconced a bad version of
corporate law and economics into the Federal Reporters. And we fear that, unless it is
corrected over time, this bad law and economics will cow regulatory agencies,
particularly the SEC, into adhering to a crabbed and inchoate vision of corporate
governance. Hopefully, criticism of the opinion will demonstrate that the court's errors
need not be replicated by others.
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